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CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 
LEVINE v. UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT: 
GAG ORDERS-THE SILENT BAR 
INTRODUCTION 
The Ninth Circuit in Levine v. United States District 
Court l granted a petition for a .writ of mandamus to review a 
district court's order prohibiting the attorneys in a criminal trial 
from communicating with the media.2 
The Ninth Circuit held that the defense attorneys' extraju-
dicial comments justifiably posed a serious and imminent threat 
to the administration of justiceS and that less restrictive alterna-
1. 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Beezer, J.; the other panel members were Sneed, 
J., special concurring opinion, and Nelson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), 
petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3533 (U.S. Jan. 29, 1986) (No. 85-1291). 
2. [d. at 591. 
3. [d. at 598. The case had been the subject of considerable national and local media 
attention. [d. at 592. At issue were various pretrial statements made by defense attor-
neys to a reporter for the Los Angeles Times, including allegations that the FBI had 
exaggerated the evidence against the defendants. Defense attorneys claimed that the 
government was unable to establish that Miller had actually passed documents to the 
Russians or had caused a breach to national security interests. Defense attorneys also 
claimed that the dismissal of various counts against the Ogorodnikovs for aiding and 
abetting espionage was a concession of a weak case and that the government's case was 
based solely on Miller's admissions made after five days of questioning. [d. 
Defense attorneys also provided detailed portions of their own case strategy. 764 
F.2d at 592. During an interview with the Los Angeles Times, defense attorneys stated 
that they intended to show that Svetlana Ogorodnikova was an emotionally troubled and 
alcoholic FBI informant with a marginal IQ who thought she was helping the FBI. Fur-
ther, the article revealed that through her sexual relationship with Miller and, earlier 
with another FBI counterintelligence agent, Svetlana Ogorodnikova was used as a means 
of infiltrating the Soviet intelligence network. Additionally, it was claimed that Miller 
49 
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tives to the gag order were not available.4 The court found, how-
ever, that the restraining order as issued was overbroadll because 
many statements that bore "upon the merits to be resolved by 
the jury" would present no danger to the administration of jus-
tice.s Accordingly, the district court was ordered to determine 
which types of extrajudicial statements posed a serious and im-
minent threat, and to fashion the order specifying the pro-
scribed types of statements.7 This was the first gag order in any 
circuit to be upheld on a district court's finding that a serious 
and imminent threat to the administration of justice existed be-
cause of the attorneys' comments.8 
too was a bumbler who, fearing that he would be pulled from the case because of his past 
record, did not tell his superiors of his attempt to infiltrate the Soviet network. The 
defense also reported that they intended to show that Nikolay Ogorodnikov, sympathetic 
with his wife's personal problems, had allowed her to live with him and their son and was 
indicted only because of 'guilt by association.' Overend, Lawyers Contend FBI E;lagger-
ated Evidence in Spy Case, Los Angeles Times, Mar. 3, 1985, V1, at 3, col. 1. 
Id. 
4. 764 F.2d at 599-600. 
5. Id. at 598-99. 
6. Id. at 599. 
7. Id. at 599-601. 
8. Id. at 597-98. The district court stated that: 
[I]n view of the comments contained in the Los Angeles 
Times article, it is plain that the serious and imminent threat 
to a fair trial outweighs any First Amendment rights at stake. 
To claim that the need to argue a client's case in detail in the 
press on the eve of trial is mandated by an ethical or legal 
responsibility belittles the government's, the defendants', and 
most importantly in this instance, the public's right to a fair 
trial before an unbiased jury. 
With the nearness of trial, the potential for prejudice be-
comes particularly acute. There's nothing in the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility requiring or even recommending that 
an attorney argue his . . . case in the press or on the court-
house steps. 
Instead, it is the integrity of our judicial process that is 
fundamentally at stake. This trial will not become a circus 
show performed outside the courtroom, yet defense counsel's 
actions clearly foreshadow such an eventuality if this court 
does not take action . 
. . . [T]his court finds it quite reasonable to expect that such 
publicity has been and will become even more pervasive, cre-
ating in effect a lobbying effort by counsel on behalf of their 
clients. The public has a right to expect a fairer trial than 
that. 
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II. FACTS 
Richard W. Miller, a former FBI agent, and Svetlana 
Ogorodnikova and her husband, Nikolay Ogorodnikov were 
charged with espionage.9 Initially the district court, aware of 
government and defense attorneys' "on the record" interviews 
with the media, admonished counsel to maintain an atmosphere 
in which a fair trial could be conducted.1o When additional com-
ments by counsel subsequently appeared in a news article just 
prior to the Ogorodnikovs' trial,ll the district court issued a re-
straining order silencing the attorneys from making statements 
to the news media.12 
On appeal, defense attorneys argued that the district court's 
order was an unconstitutional restraint on the media's ability to 
gather news.13 Additionally, defense attorneys claimed that the 
district court's findings were inadequate, unsupported by the 
record, and would not properly sustain its gag order. For these 
reasons, appellants contended that the order abridged their first 
amendment right to free speech.14 
9. 764 F.2d at 591-92. On October 2, 1984, Richard W. Miller and Svetlana 
Ogorodnikova and Nikolay Ogorodnikov, were arrested and charged, inter alia, with con-
spiring to transmit national defense and classified information to agents and representa-
tives of the Soviet Union. An indictment was returned on October 12, 1984 naming all 
three defendants; a superseding indictment was returned in November, 1984. The indict-
ment also named Aleksandr Grishin, Vice Counsel, Soviet Consulate, San Francisco, Ca., 
as an unindicted co-conspirator. [d. The Ogorodnikovs' trial was severed on January 22, 
1985 and the government's case was soon to proceed at the time of the district court's 
restraining order. [d. 
lO. [d. at 592. During a status conference on November 6, 1984, the district court 
admonished the parties not to engage in pretrial publicity. [d. In response to additional 
comments made by the defense counsel to the media, the government filed a motion for 
an order restraining extrajudicial statements by the parties and their agents on Novem-
ber 22, 1984. [d. The district court denied the motion on December 14, 1984 but again 
sought the cooperation of counsel. [d. Defense attorneys advised the district court that 
they might "at some future time deem it necessary in the interest of our client to make a 
statement outside the courtroom." [d. 
11. See supra note 9. 
12. 764 F.2d at 593. The government renewed its motion for the restraining order in 
order to protect the rights of all parties and the public to a fair trial. [d. A hearing was 
held on March 5, 1985, where Levine acknowledged that he had spoken with the reporter 
although he had not been quoted. [d. After reviewing the statements reported in the 
article, the district court ordered the restraining order encompassing all attorneys, all 
parties, their representatives and agents, and witnesses. [d. In June, the district court 
removed the parties and the witnesses from the scope of the order. [d. 
13. [d. at 594. 
14. [d. at 595. Appellants argued that the order could be upheld only if the govern-
3
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. FAIR TRIAL-FREE PRESS 
The Supreme Court has long held that the very essence of a 
fair trial as guaranteed by the sixth amendment is dependent 
upon a panel of impartial jurors, free from outside influences. Iii 
The pervasiveness of modern news coveragel6 has set an ac-
cused's sixth amendment right to a fair trial against the press' 
first amendment right to be free from governmental restraint. 17 
The publicity which attends certain criminal trials has re-
quired the Supreme Court to establish guidelines concerning the 
ment had shown that an impartial jury could not be selected, that the district court had 
overstated the amount of publicity in the case, and that the order was both vague and 
overbroad. Id. at 598-99. Appellants also challenged the district court's finding that less 
restrictive alternatives to the restraining order were not available. Id. They argued that a 
searching voir dire would eliminate any bias caused by pretrial publicity and that the 
record did not prove that jurors would not follow emphatic and clear instructions by the 
court. Id. at 599-600. 
15. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965)(the right to a fair trial held to 
be "the most fundamental of all freedoms"); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,721 (1965)(an 
accused's sixth amendment right to a panel of unbiased jurors held to be "most price-
less"); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976); and Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966). 
16. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 362. In Sheppard, Justice Clark noted that 
"[g)iven the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing prej-
udicial publicity from the minds of jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to 
ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused." Id. 
Earlier in Irvin v. Dowd, Justice Frankfurter observed that in each term substantial 
claims were made that a jury trial had been distorted because of inflammatory newspa-
per accounts making it difficult, if not impossible, to secure an unbiased jury. 366 U.S. at 
730. See also Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 195 (1952)(extensive adverse modern 
coverage, albeit pervasive and prejudicial, does not alone presumptively deprive an ac-
cused of his right to a fair trial). 
17. The sixth amendment provides that "[iJn all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... " U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI. The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press .... U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
The Supreme Court has observed that 
[aJ responsible press has always been regarded as the hand-
maiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the 
criminal field .... The Press does not simply publish infor-
mation about trials but guards against the miscarriage of jus-
tice by subjecting the police, prosecutors and the judicial 
processes to extensive scrutiny and criticism. 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,350 (1966). See Nebraska Press Aas'n v. Stuart, 427 
U.S. 539, 561 (1976); CBS v. United States District Court, 729 F.2d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
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judiciary's power to restrict prejudicial publicity. IS In Sheppard 
v. Maxwell,19 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction of mur-
der because the lower court failed to invoke procedures to pro-
tect the defendant from the massive, pervasive and prejudicial 
publicity that attended his prosecution.20 The defendant, 
charged with bludgeoning his pregnant wife to death in their 
home, was, from the outset, the focus of official attention and 
the subject of media headlines.21 The lower court had further 
failed to take adequate steps to control the media's conduct in 
the courtroom.22 The lack of any restraints on the press had re-
sulted in bedlam and an atmosphere that the Ohio Supreme 
Court labelled a "Roman Holiday" for the news media.23 The 
United States Supreme Court found that the trial court's "fun-
damental error" in permitting such an unrestrained atmosphere 
was exacerbated by the court's disavowal that it had the power 
to control the publicity about the triap· The Supreme Court 
confirmed the trial court's authority and responsibility to pro-
18. "In an overwhelming majority of criminal trials, pretrial publicity presents few 
unmanageable threats to [an accused's sixth amendment right]. But when the case is a 
"sensational" one tensions develop between the right of the accused to a trial by an 
impartial jury and the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment." Nebraska Press 
Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 551. 
19. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
20. [d. at 335. 
21. [d. The totality of the circumstances in the Sheppard prosecution had denied 
the accused a fair trial. For months before the trial, virulent publicity made the case 
notorious. Headline stories concentrated on Sheppard's lack of cooperation and refusal 
to take a lie detector test. [d. at 338. An inquest was called where Sheppard was 
searched in full view of a swarm of media personnel and a multitude of spectators and 
ended with the defense attorney excluded from the room. [d. at 339-40. His personal life 
and extramarital affairs were aired and manipulated. [d. at 340. By the time Sheppard 
was convicted there were enough media clippings to fill five volumes. [d. at 342. 
Twenty-five days before trial, 75 veniremen were called as prospective jurors. Their 
names and addresses were published and many received letters and phone calls regard-
ing the prosecution. [d. at 342. The jurors were continually exposed to the media and 
even had their pictures taken in the jury box and jury room. [d. at 345. Only given 
"suggestions" and "requests" not to comment on the case, jurors were pursued by the 
media and thrust into the "role of celebrities." [d. at 353. Much of the material printed 
or broadcast was never heard from the witness stand. [d. at 360. 
22. The Supreme Court found numerous instances where bedlam reigned during the 
trial. Twenty reporters sat at a table only a few feet away from the counsel's table and 
jury box. Representatives of the media filled the majority of the courtroom, taking a 
front seat to the defendant's own family. Reporters moved in and out of the courtroom 
causing confusion and disruption. The media had total freedom in the corridors and were 
accosting those entering and leaving the courtroom. [d. at 355. Only belatedly were the 
reporters asked not to handle the evidence. [d. at 358. 
23. [d. at 356. 
24. [d. at 357. 
5
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tect a defendant's right to a fair trial consistent with due pro-
cess. 21i To assure this mandate, the Supreme Court enumerated 
measures available to trial courts in order to avoid the problems 
that beleaguered the case.26 These procedures included regulat-
ing the conduct of newsmen and controlling information re-
leased by counsel for both sides.27 
The problem of prejudicial publicity had already manifested 
itself in cases preceding Sheppard.28 The cumulative effect led 
the Supreme Court in Sheppard to caution trial courts of the 
need to take "strong measures" to ensure that the delicate bal-
ance between fair trial and open press "is never weighed against 
the accused."29 With this directive, Sheppard provided the pre-
cedent for the future course of fair trial-free press issues.30 
1. The Right to Report Events 
Trial courts began utilizing restraining orders to prevent the 
25. Id. at 358-62. 
26. These measures included adopting stricter rules for the use of the courtroom by 
the media, limiting their number, and more closely supervising their courtroom conduct. 
Further, the Supreme Court stated that the court should have insulated the witnesses; 
controlled the release of leads, information and gossip to the press by police officers, 
witnesses and counsel; and proscribed extrajudicial statements by lawyers, witnesses, 
parties or court officials divulging prejudicial matters. Additionally, the Supreme Court 
pointed out that the court could request appropriate city officials to regulate information 
released by their employees. 384 U.S. at 358-62. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 
366 n.8 (4th Cir. 1979)(noting that these procedures have been interpreted as a directive 
rather than a suggestion). 
Chief Justice Burger, in Nebraska Press Ass'n, listed traditional alternatives to prior 
restraints of publication: (a) a change of venue; (b) postponement of the trial date; (c) 
searching voir dire; (d) use of emphatic and clear instructions; and (e) sequestration. 427 
U.S. at 565 (citing with approval Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966)). 
27. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358-62. . 
28. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550-51 (1965)(defendant denied due pro-
cess where the televising of his entire trial affected jurors, witnesses and judge); Rideau 
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 724-27 (1963)(refusal to change venue of trial denial of due 
process where film of defendant confessing to sheriff was shown three times on TV and 
seen in a community of approximately 150,000); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723-28 
(1961)(conviction of murder overturned where extensive publicity affected pool of venire-
men and newspaper coverage which appeared in 95% of homes in county included de-
tails of defendant's background, previous criminal record, line-up identification, and 
confessions). 
29. 384 U.S. at 362. 
30. See Portman, The Defense of Trial from Sheppard to Nebraska Press Associa-
tion: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. REV. 393, 403 (1977). 
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publication of prejudicial material. 31 In one line of cases, courts 
have attempted to restrain the right of the press to report events 
relating to criminal proceedings.32 However, in Nebraska Press 
Association u. Stuart,33 the Supreme Court invalidated such a 
restraining order on first amendment grounds.3• The crime, 
which took place in a small rural community, involved a brutal 
murder.3l1 A description of the suspect was released by the police 
and immediately attracted extensive local, regional and national 
news coverage.36 The trial court found that the potential for pre-
trial publicity concerning the murder posed a threat to the ac-
cused's right to a fair trial. 37 
The gag order in Nebraska Press Association prohibited 
members of a state press association from publishing or broad-
casting accounts or admissions and other facts, "strongly impli-
cative" of the defendant as the murderer, that were made to 
persons other than the press.38 The Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction because the trial court failed to show that the alter-
natives to prior restraints outlined in Sheppard39 would be in-
31. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. 539, 543-46 (1976)(gag order prohib-
ited state press association from publishing accounts, admissions and information 
strongly implicative of accused as murderer). 
32. See, e.g., id.; CBS v. United States District Court, 729 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 
1983)(district court's order restraining television network from disseminating and/or 
broadcasting any portion of government's surveillance tapes violated first amendment 
guarantee of the press where no showing that unchecked publicity would distort views of 
potential jurors). 
33. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
34. [d. at 570. The Supreme Court set forth the following three-part test for evalu-
ating the constitutionality of prior restraints on the press: 
[d. at 562. 
[W]e must examine the evidence before the trial judge when 
the order was entered to determine (a) the nature and extent 
of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would 
be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial public-
ity; and (c) how effectively a restraining order would operate 
to prevent the threatened danger. 
35. [d. at 542. In a small rural town in Nebraska of about 850 people, defendant had 
murdered six members of a family in their home during the course of a sexual assault. 
[d. 
36. [d. 
37. The trial court's conclusion "as to the impact of such publicity ... was of ne-
cessity speculative, dealing as he was with factors unknown and unknowable." [d. at 563. 
38. [d. at 568. 
39. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 563-64 (citing with approval Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966». See supra note 26. 
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sufficient to mitigate the adverse effects of pretrial publicity,40 
because the restraining order would not serve its intended pur-
pose,41 and because the prohibition regarding "implicative" in-
formation was too vague and too overbroad to survive the scru-
tiny given to restraints on first amendment rights.42 Applying a 
"clear and present danger" standard,43 the Court reaffirmed the 
presumptive invalidity of prior restraints" and unanimously in-
validated the order.411 
40. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 565-68. 
41. [d. The Supreme Court noted that because the murders took place in such a 
small community, rumors would have spread by word of mouth even without the news 
accounts. Further, since the order also prohibited the reporting of evidence adduced at 
an open preliminary hearing it violated first amendment principles: "[T)here is nothing 
that prOscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom." [d. at 
568 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966». 
42. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 568. 
43. [d. at 562. Chief Justice Burger adopted the "clear and present danger" test 
articulated in the Court of Appeals decision by Judge Learned Hand in United States u. 
Dennis. In Dennis, defendants, leaders of the Communist Party in the United States 
were convicted under the Smith Act for conspiring to teach and advocate the overthrow 
and destruction of the United States by force and violence. 183 F.2d 201, 205-06 (2d Cir. 
1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951). 
Judge Hand stated that the validity of subsequent punishment under the Smith Act 
is determined by whether "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justi-
fies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 183 F.2d at 212. 
But see Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contrac-
tion of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 459-61 (1977)(questioning the appropriateness of 
this test by suggesting that it is both inconsistent in light of Chief Justice Burger's own 
differentiation of first amendment considerations between subsequent punishment and 
prior restraints and a weak and amorphous standard). 
44. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 558. Chief Justice Burger characterized prior 
restraints as, "the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment 
rights .... A prior restraint ... has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can 
be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior 
restraint 'freezes' it at least for a time." [d. at 559. See New York Times v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rei. Olson, 283 U.S. 197 (1931). 
45. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 570-617. Five separate opinions were pub-
lished. Chief Justice Burger reaffirmed that first amendment protection was not abso-
lute, but that the presumption against prior restraints remains intact. [d. at 570. Justice 
White added that there was a grave doubt in his mind as to whether restraints on the 
press could ever be justified. [d. (White, J., concurring). Justice Powell emphasized the 
heavy burden that rests on any party who seeks a prior restraint on pretrail publicity. [d. 
at 571-72 (Powell, J., concurring). 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Stewart and Justice Marshall would have held 
that a prior restraint on the freedom of the press was unconstitutionally impermissible 
as a means of protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial. [d. at 572 (Brennan, J., con-
curring). Justice Stevens, agreed with Justice Brennan, but was not so willing to give the 
same absolute protection, without considering the nature and means by which the infor-
mation was obtained. [d. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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Recently, in Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. United 
States District Court/'s the Ninth Circuit invalidated a similar 
order restraining a television network from disseminating or 
broadcasting any portion of the surveillance tapes made while 
the government was investigating John DeLorean's involvement 
in a major cocaine transaction.47 The appellate court disagreed 
with the district court's contention that the nature of the tapes 
distinguished this case from other publicized trials.48 Applying 
the test enumerated in Nebraska Press Association,49 the court 
noted that a prior restraint is invalid "unless it is 'clear that fu-
ture publicity, unchecked, would so distort the views of potential 
jurors that 12 could not be found who would ... fulfill their 
sworn duty.' "110 The court instead considered the nature of the 
casellI and the venue of the triaP2 It looked not only to the ef-
fect that the videotape might have had on individual viewers but 
also to the impact that the publicity might have had to imflame 
and prejudice the entire community. liS The court found that the 
defendant's activities in a nonviolent crime were insufficiently 
lurid or sensational, despite the defendant's prominence, to taint 
all of the twelve million people in the Central District of Califor-
46. 729 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1983). See Note, John Z. DeLorean v. The Media: The 
Right To A Fair Trial Without A Prior Restraint Upon The Media, 15 GOLDEN GATE 
U.L. REV. 81 (1985). 
47. 729 F.2d at 1176. 
48. [d. at 1180. 
49. See supra note 34. 
50. 729 F.2d at 1180 (emphasis in original) (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 
427 U.S. 539, 569). 
51. 729 F.2d at 1181. The court found that in cases in which the defendant was 
denied a fair trial, there was lurid and inflammatory subject matter involving violence 
and passion. On the other hand, cases involving other offenses, such as white collar 
crime, do not pose the same danger. The Ninth Circuit cited with approval the District 
of Columbia Circuit which stated about the Watergate case that it "may come as a sur-
prise to lawyers and judges, but it is simply a fact of life that matters which interest 
them may be less fascinating to the public generally." [d. (quoting United States v. Hal-
deman, 559 F.2d 31, 62 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). 
52. 729 F.2d at 1181-82. In large urban areas courts have held that prejudicial pub-
licity is a lesser danger than in small rural communities "where [tlhe whole community 
... becomes interested in all the morbid details." [d. at 1181 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 
381 U.S. 532, 545 (1965)). The court in CBS also commented that in addition to the large 
population in the Central District of California, the heterogeneity of the district was also 
a significant factor making it unlikely that even the most sensational case would become 
a cause celebre. 729 F.2d at 1181. 
53. [d. at 1180. The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court failed to make such 
an analysis. For that reason alone, the court found that the district court's conclusion 
that the release of the surveillance tapes would be prejudicial was suspect. [d. 
9
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nia.G4 The Ninth Circuit further confirmed the validity of tradi-
tional methods utilized in avoiding prejudicial publicity, short of 
the prior restraint. GG 
2. The Right of Access 
Courts have further attempted to minImize the effect of 
prejudicial publicity by restraining the media's access to crimi-
nal proceedings.G6 For the first time, in Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. u. Virginia,G7 the Supreme Court concluded that the first 
and fourteenth amendments afforded the public and the media 
the right of access to a criminal trial.G8 In the words of the 
Court, "absent an overriding interest articulated in the findings, 
the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public."G9 The 
Court reasoned that historically the presence of the public and 
the media at a criminal trial have significantly enhanced the in-
tegrity and the quality of the judicial processes.60 Despite the 
fact that this was the accused's fourth trial,61 the Supreme Court 
found that the trial court's order to close the proceedings was 
defective since it had not considered alternative solutions such 
54. Id. at 1181-82. 
55. Id. at 1183. See supra note 26 for discussion of the traditional methods for 
avoiding prejudicial publicity. 
56. Compare Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 385 (1979) (sixth 
amendment right to a public trial personal to accused and does not give the public or 
press an enforceable right of access to a pretrial suppression hearing) with United States 
v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982)(first amendment right of access to criminal 
trials applies to suppression hearings). See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) ("presumption of openness" gives public right of access to crim· 
inal trials); Associated Press v. United States District Court, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 
1983)(closure order pertaining to pretrial criminal documents violates public's first 
amendment right d access). 
57. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
58. Id. at 580. In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court rejected the premise that 
the first amendment afforded a reporter a constitutional testimonial privilege to refuse to 
name his confidential sources when testifying pursuant to a grand jury subpoena. 408 
U.S. 665, 702 (1972). However, the Court recognized that gathering of news qualified for 
some first amendment protection. Id. at 681. In the context of a criminal trial, later 
decisions, such as Richmond Newspapers, defined this right to attend the trial and to 
report on what transpired. 448 U.S. at 576-77. See also KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Mari· 
copa County Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 431, 441 (1984)(media liaison order 
was proper exercise of trial court's duty to protect accused's right to a fair trial; sketch 
order unconstitutional prior restraint on press' first amendment right of access). 
59. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581. 
60. Id. at 569-73. 
61. Id. at 559. Defendant's conviction for murder after his first trial was reversed on 
appeal and two subsequent retrials ended in mistrials. Id. 
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as the possibility of excluding witnesses or sequestering jurors.6l1 
The closure order abridged the public's first amendment inter-
ests because the trial court and the parties had unfettered dis-
cretion in closing the proceeding.63 
Similarly, in Associated Press v. United States District 
Court,64 the Ninth Circuit held that a district court's blanket 
order sealing pretrial criminal documents violated the public's 
first amendment right of access.611 Responding to the extensive 
press coverage generated in the DeLorean case, the district court 
issued the closure order sua sponte.66 Even though some docu-
ments were to be sealed for only forty-eight hours, the Ninth 
Circuit struck down the closure order because the trial court had 
not shown that this procedure was "strictly and inescapably nec-
essary in order to protect the fair-trial guarantee."67 
B. FAIR TRIAL-FREE SPEECH 
Sheppard v. Maxwell68 marked the first time that the Su-
preme Court recommended alternatives to restraints on the 
press in order to mitigate the problems caused by pervasive pub-
licity.69 The Supreme Court found that the inflammatory public-
ity which frustrated the trial court's function in that case might 
62. ld. at 580-81 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966) and Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1976». See supra note 26. 
63. 448 U.S. at 584-98 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
64. 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983). 
65. ld. at 1145-47. In order to satisfy the burden in closing a trial the accused must 
show: 
[I] a substantial probability that irreparable damage to his 
fair-trial right will result from conducting the proceeding in 
public . . . [2] a substantial probability that alternatives to 
closure will not protect adequately his right to a fair trial . . . 
[3] a substantial probability that closure will be effective in 
protecting against the preceived harm. 
ld. at 1145-47 (citing United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1982». 
66. 705 F.2d at 1144. The order was issued "without any notice to, or opportunity to 
be heard by, the parties, the press, or the public." ld. 
67. ld. at 1145. See also Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)(no spe-
cial protection for newspapers that might be searched by government authorities pursu-
ant to a search warrant); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)(no constitutional testi-
monial privilege for reporters refusing to disclose names of confidential sources while 
testifying pursuant to grand jury subpoena). 
68. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
69. ld. at 362-63. See supra note 26. 
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well have been prevented by effective control of the sources.70 
Specifically, the Court called for silencing extrajudicial state-
ments made by the trial participants.71 
1. Restraints on Attorneys: Disciplinary Rule 7-107 
In 1969, the American Bar Association adopted DR 7-107 to 
give force to an attorney's ethical obligations to prevent adverse 
trial publicity.72 Taking its cue from case law, the rule is con-
70. 384 U.S. at 359-61. In Sheppard, prejudicial news accounts could be traced both 
to the prosecution and the defense. Much of that evidence was never offered at trial. The 
trial court "should have made some effort to control the release of leads, information and 
gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses and the counsel for both sides." 1d. at 
359. 
71. 1d. "[T]he trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any 
lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters, such as ... 
statements concerning the merits of the case." 1d. at 361. The Supreme Court has seen 
that the cure lies in 
those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its 
inception. The courts must take steps by rule and regulation 
that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside influ-
ences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, 
witnesses ... should be permitted to frustrate its function. 
Collaboration between counsel and the press . . . is highly 
censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures. 
1d. at 362-63 (emphasis omitted). 
72. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-107 (1969). California has 
not adopted DR 7-107, nor has the Central District of California adopted a local rule 
dealing specifically with extrajudicial statements. 
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE. FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, Standard 8-
Ll (1980): 
Standard 8-1.1. Extrajudicial statements by attorneys: 
(a) A lawyer shall not release or authorize the release of 
information or opinion for dissemination by any means of 
public communication if such dissemination would pose a 
clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial. 
(b) ... [F]rom the commencement of the investigation of 
a criminal matter until the completion of trial or disposition 
without trial, a lawyer may be subject to disciplinary action 
with respect to extrajudicial statements concerning the follow-
ing matters: 
(i) the prior criminal record ... the character or reputa-
tion of the accused, or any opinion as to the accused's guilt or 
innocence or as to the merits of the case or the evidence in the 
case[.] 
See also Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the 
Jury System, "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 401-03 (1968). The Commit-
tee recommended action in three areas: 
(1) that the district courts have the power and the duty to 
control the release of prejudicial information by attorneys; 
12
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cerned with the effects of prejudicial publicity on criminal jury 
trials73 and has withstood constitutional analysis.74 
In Hirschkop v. Snead,75 the Fourth Circuit noted that at-
torneys, as officers of the court, have a fiduciary duty "to the 
court, to the litigants ... and to the public to protect the judi-
cial processes from extraneous influences which impair its 
fairness. "76 
In Hirschkop, a Virginia attorney brought suit challenging 
the constitutionality of that state's disciplinary rule restricting 
[d. at 401. 
recommends action by local rule to restrict the release of such 
information; (2) that a similar power existed to restrict disclo-
sures by court personnel; and (3) that each district provide by 
local rule for specific orders governing the proceedings in any 
case in which prejudicial influences might otherwise penetrate 
a trial. 
73. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 550 (1976). 
74. Two circuits have upheld in principle the enforcement of ethical rules restricting 
lawyers' comments concerning pending cases. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 374 
(4th Cir. 1979)(upholding disciplinary rules as applied to criminal jury trials, requiring a 
reasonable likelihood standard). The Hirschkop court applied the two-step test formu-
lated in Procunier v. Martinez for determining the constitutionality of governmental re-
straints on speech: "First, the regulation ... in question must further an important or 
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of the expression .... 
Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is neces-
sary or essential to the particular governmental interest involved." [d. at 363 (citing 
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)). But ct. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. 
Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago 
Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976)(disciplinary rules upheld but must incorporate 
"serious and imminent danger" standard into specific rules governing conduct). 
75. 594 F.2d at 366. The court ruled that Hirschkop had standing to challenge the 
rule even though there were no pending complaints charging him with violations. 
Hirschkop, who was active in civil rights and civil liberties matters, had 22 complaints 
filed against him from 1965 to 1975. When the State Bar Executive Committee admitted 
that the claims were meritless, Hirschkop agreed to drop his claims against the State 
Bar. The settlement agreement, however, did not consider the rule's constitutionality nor 
immunize the attorney from appropriate disciplinary action in the future. [d. at 363. 
76. 594 F.2d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 1979). In his concurring opinion in Nebraska Press 
Ass'n, Justice Brennan stated that: 
As officers of the court, court personnel and attorneys have a 
fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public debate that 
will redound to the detriment of the accused or that will ob-
struct the fair administration of justice. It is very doubtful 
that the court would not have the power to control release of 
information by these individuals ... and to impose suitable 
limitations whose transgression could result in disciplinary 
proceedings. 
427 U.S. at 601 n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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attorneys' comments about pending litigation.77 In sustaining 
the constitutionality of the disciplinary rule, the Fourth Circuit 
reasoned that the rule amounted to a legislative finding that cer-
tain speech for publication by an attorney engaged in pending or 
contemplated litigation would be so inherently prejudicial to the 
system's integrity and an accused's right to a fair trial that it 
may be proscribed.78 Because questions of the admissibility of 
evidence were undecided at the time of publication, the Fourth 
Circuit was satisfied that speech which had a "reasonable likeli-
hood of interference" with a fair trial was contemplated by the 
rule.79 The court found that Virginia's rule was definitive as to 
the types of statements it proscribed.80 Further, since the rule 
was distinguishable from a prior restraint, as it imposed sanc-
tions post-judgment, the court declined to impose the more 
stringent "clear and present danger" standard devised for and 
applicable to prior restraints.81 
In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,82 the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated that where there is tension between an attorney's 
right to free speech and an accused's right to fair trial, the for-
mer must yield to the latter.8s The court conceded that an attor-
ney's statements may be the source of prejudicial publicity ne-
cessitating prohibitions on their speech.84 At the same time, 
however, the court noted that countervailing factors exist, espe-
cially for the defense.86 It stated that, as sources of crucial infor-
77. Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 374. 
78. Id. at 366-67. 
79. Id. As an example, the court noted that premature release of a defendant's prior 
record or confession before the trial court had ruled on its admissibility would threaten 
the integrity of subsequent proceedings. Id. at 368. 
80.Id. 
81. Id. at 368 n.13. The court stated that if the defendant decided not to contest the 
admissibility of his confession, or, having contested it, the court ruled against him, there 
was only a potential for prejudice. The court could not be certain that the standard 
requiring a clear and present danger or serious and imminent danger would ever be met. 
Id. 
82. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago 
Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). In this case, an association of local attorneys 
brought a proceeding for declaratory judgment and injunction against the enforcement of 
local "no-comment" rules seeking to proscribe extrajudicial statements by attorneys dur-
ing both civil and criminal cases. Id. at 247. The district court entered a judgment grant-
ing the motion of defendants and intervenors to dismiss for failure to state a cause of 
action.Id. 
83. Id. at 248. 
84. Id. at 250. 
85.Id. 
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mation, attorneys served an important function as a check on 
the government by exposing abuses or urging action.86 Further, 
the attorney, who was more articulate and more knowledgeable 
in the law than the accused, could best counter any injury to the 
defendant or his family caused by the publicity generated when 
it becomes publicly known that a person is under investigation 
or has been indicted.87 
While not finding the "no-comment" rule a traditional prior 
restraint, the Seventh Circuit recognized that the rule involved 
86. [d. The dissenting opinion in the denial of rehearing en banc in Levine, stated: 
"[T)he freedom to make ... a charge [that an indictment is 
politically or religiously motivated) against the state is surely 
paramount among the freedoms protected by the first amend-
ment. To deprive an accused of his most valuable resource in 
criticizing the government-his lawyer-is to restrict, and to 
restrict severely, his first amendment rights." 
775 F.2d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir. 1985)(Norris, J., dissenting). 
87. 522 F.2d at 250. Moreover, as recognized by a prominent criminal defense attor-
ney, defense attorneys will strive to neutralize the imbalance caused by the initial publi-
cation by the government by seeking a partial jury. CALIFORNIA DEFENDER 68 (Spring 
1985)(interview with Howard L. Weitzman). Weitzman commented on the need to 
orchestrate media exposure in the DeLorean case: 
In determining whether or not to work with the press, you 
should first consider whether the government used the press 
Inevitably the government uses the press ... to begin a 
campaign in an attempt to bias and prejudice the public image 
of the defendants .... [I)t is encumbent upon the defense 
attorney representing a client in a high publicity case to at-
tempt to neutralize the negative publicity .... 
It must be remembered that the potential jurors read the 
press releases and come into court with an impression in high 
profile cases of what the case is all about. 
CALIFORNIA DEFENDER at 69. 
See also 775 F.2d at 1055. The dissenting opinion from the denial of rehearing en 
banc in Levine found it implicit in Judge Beezer's majority and Judge Sneed's concur-
ring opinions that there was something improper and even possibly unethical for a law-
yer not to limit his client's defense to in-court statements. This, the dissent argued, was 
a myopic view considering that whel', as in this case, an indictment is the subject of 
great public interest, the damage to the accused's reputation and the resulting emotional 
distress can be magnified. 
[d. 
The range of options available to the lawyer must include 
speaking out publicly to mitigate the damage to the client in 
the eyes of the community at large. Marshalled against the ac-
cused is not only the awesome resources and prestige of the 
United States Government, but also the power of the media to 
disseminate the government's charges. 
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inherent features that were similar to prior restraints.88 The 
court ruled, therefore, that "[o]nly those comments that pose a 
'serious and imminent threat' of interference with the fair ad-
ministration of justice can be constitutionally proscribed. "89 
2. Prior Restraints on Trial Participants 
A majority of courts have upheld gag orders on trial partici-
pants.90 These courts are in disagreement, however, as to which 
standard is appropriate to determine the validity of the order. In 
In re Russell,9} the court found that a gag order prohibiting wit-
nesses from discussing proposed trial testimony with the media 
did not violate the witnesses' first amendment rights.92 Petition-
ers were selected as potential witnesses in a criminal proceeding 
88. 522 F.2d at 248·49. The court noted that a prior restraint constituted a prede-
termined judicial prohibition restraining specific expression. This order could not be vio-
lated even if the judicial action was unconstitutional as long as opportunities for appeal 
existed. Id. at 248. "The validity of the rules, however, can be challenged by one prose-
cuted for violating them since ... there is a fundamental distinction ... between ac-
tions taken by the court in its legislative role and those taken in its adjudicative role." 
Id. 
89. Id. at 249. The court emphasized that while the "serious and imminent threat" 
of interference would eliminate overbreadth, specific rules were also necessary to avoid 
vagueness. Id. at 249·50. As an example, the phrase "participating in or associated with 
the investigation" as used in the local "no-comment" rule and the American Bar Associa-
tion rule proscribing extrajudicial statements during the investigating stage was found to 
be too vague as applied to defense attorneys. The local rule could be used to establish a 
presumption of serious and imminent threat to a fair trial only as applied to government 
attorneys. Id. at 252-53. The term "merits" as incorporated into that rule excluded those 
statements which were arguably opinions on merits and 'which should not be restricted, 
then it could properly be used creating a presumption of a serious and imminent threat. 
Id. at 255. 
90. See, e.g., In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007, 1010 (4th Cir.) (gag order prohibiting 
potential witnesses from discussing their proposed trial testimony with news media did 
not violate witnesses' first amendment rights), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct 134 (1984); United 
States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.)(order prohibiting trial participants' 
statements regarding the merits of the case did not violate first amendment), cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969); Central South Carolina Chapter of Professional Journalists v. 
Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182, 1190 (D.S.C. 1977)(society of news media establishments 
sought injunctive relief against court order restraining trial participants from "mingling" 
with the press near the courthouse and from giving news interviews not impermissibly 
vague or overbroad), aff'd in part, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1022 (1978); KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Maricopa County Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 
678 P.2d 431 (1984)(media liaison order was proper exercise of trial court's duty to pro-
tect accused's right to a fair trial; sketch order unconstitutional prior restraint on press' 
first amendment right of access). 
91. 726 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 134 (1984). 
92. Id. at 1010. 
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against alleged members of the Ku Klux Klan and Nazi Party 
that involved a shooting incident in Greensboro, North Caro-
lina.93 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the publicity which 
the trial had already attracted, together with the inflammatory 
and prejudicial statements that reasonably could be expected 
from the witnesses, and the ineffectiveness of alternative meth-
ods available, supported the trial court's determination that 
there was a reasonable likelihood that the defendants would be 
denied a fair trial. 9' The court also found that the order was not 
vague or overbroad when it prohibited the witnesses from mak-
ing extrajudicial statements related to their testimony, or to any 
other party or issue which they might reasonably expect to be 
involved in the case, or to any of the events leading up to the 
incident.91i 
Similarly, in United States v. Tijerina,96 the Tenth Circuit 
upheld an order forbidding extrajudicial statements made by the 
trial participants concerning, among other things, the merits of 
the case and evidence.97 At issue were various statements made 
by the defendants at a public political convention.98 The court 
found these statements endangered the rights of the defendants 
and the government to a fair and impartial jury.99 It further 
found that a fair trial applied to both the prosecution and the 
defense. loo Thus, the court rejected the defendants' contention 
that they could not be charged with a violation of the order be-
cause the order was entered for their protection.IOI Since there 
was a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news would affect an 
impartial jury and prevent a fair trial, the court found that the 
defendants' first amendment rights had not been violated. lo2 
An order similar to the one issued in Tijerina was struck 
down by the Seventh Circuit in Chase v. Robson. lo3 Defendants 
93. Id. at 1008. 
94. Id. at 1010. 
95. Id. at 1011. 
96. 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969). 
97. Id. at 663. 
98.Id. 




103. 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970)(per curiam). 
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had been charged with removing and destroying selective service 
records maintained at the Chicago area headquarters. lo", The 
trial court based its order on newspaper accounts that were 
seven months old as well as the defense attorney's past associa-
tion with William Kunstler, an attorney not involved in the 
case. lOll Unlike the Tijerina court, the Seventh Circuit required a 
showing of a clear and present danger of a serious and imminent 
threat to the administration of justice before allowing the gag 
order. IDe The court found that the dated newspaper accounts 
and the defense attorney's past association with a well-known 
attorney were not only insufficient for the stricter standard, but 
also did not satisfy the lesser finding of a reasonable likelihood 
of a serious and imminent threat to the administration of jus-
tice. lo7 Moreover the court found that the order, which applied 
to the fifteen defendants and their three attorneys, was uncon-
stitutionally overbroad as it also included unprohibited 
speech. IDS 
In In re Halkin,109 an order which prohibited extrajudicial 
disclosure of information by counsel and parties was deficient 
because the order did not specify the reasons for the prohibi-
tion. 110 Defendant charged that certain government agencies had 
conducted unlawful surveillance of United States citizens who 
opposed the Vietnam War.lll The order barred the parties and 
their counsel from making statements about information ob-
tained through discovery, and from publicly disclosing the mate-
rial, except as such material became part of the record.112 The 
District of Columbia Circuit found that the order prohibiting 
political expression was overbroad since there were no expressed 
findings, no reasons articulated, and no evidence presented as to 
whether publication would preclude a fair trial.113 
104. [d. at 1060. 
105. [d. 
106. [d. at 1061. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. 
109. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979). 
110. [d. at 196-97. 
111. [d. at 180. 
112. [d. at 179. 
113. [d. at 196-97. When the order was issued, however, the trial court had actually 
only examined, in addition to the moving papers, memoranda and the parties' correspon-
dence, a two paragraph letter from plaintiff's counsel describing three documents and 
photocopies that the plaintiffs proposed to release to the media, and a draft press release 
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III. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY 
The primary issue on appeal in Levine was whether the 
district court should be compelled to dissolve its gag order si-
lencing the attorneys from communicating with the media about 
the merits of the case.11• The Ninth Circuit confirmed peti-
tioner's characterization that the order was a prior restraint. m 
Moreover, because the district court's order did not prohibit the 
press from attending the criminal proceedings or reporting 
about them,116 the Ninth Circuit distinguished the press issue 
raised here from those issues raised in Associated Press v. 
United States District Courtll7 and Columbia Broadcasting 
Systems v. United States District Court.11S By denying the me-
dia access to the litigants, the court conceded that the gag order 
raised a different first amendment issue by impairing the me-
dia's ability to gather news. ll9 The Ninth Circuit concluded, 
however, that the petitioners lacked standing to assert the rights 
of nonparty media organizations.120 
Thus the court's analysis focused on the attorneys' rights to 
free speech.121 The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the 
restraining order against the defense attorneys prevented the 
describing the significance of the documents. Id. 
114. 764 F.2d at 591. 
115. Id. at 595. 
116. Id. at 594. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
117. 705 F.2d 1143, 1145·47 (9th Cir. 1983). See supra note 64 and accompanying 
text. 
118. 729 F.2d 1174, 1178·79 (9th Cir. 1983). See supra note 46 and accompanying 
text. 
119. 764 F.2d at 594. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Supreme 
Court found that news gathering qualified for first amendment protection.Id. at 681. See 
supra note 58. However, in KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Maricopa County Superior 
Court, a media liaison order was found to be outside the scope of the press' first amend· 
ment right to attend and report on criminal trials, and only to collaterally affect the 
media's ability to interview trial participants. 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 431, 439 (1984). 
120. 764 F.2d at 594. Subsequently, the Radio and Television News Association of 
Southern California, an organization representing broadcast journalists, filed a petition 
for writ of mandamus seeking to compel the district court to vacate its gag order. The 
Ninth Circuit held that gag orders restraining trial counsel from making extrajudicial 
statements to the news media, while indirectly denying the media access to trial partici· 
pants, did not infringe on the first amendment rights of the press. Radio and T.V. News 
Assoc. v. United States District Court, 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986). 
121. Id. at 595. 
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defendant from communicating with the media.122 The court 
reasoned that Miller had access to the media because he had 
testified at the Ogorodnikovs' trial and was not prevented by the 
gag order from issuing a statement through his family.123 Addi-
tionally, because the restraining order only limited extrajudicial 
statements by Miller's attorneys, who were free to present his 
case in open court, the Ninth Circuit did not decide whether the 
gag order was permissible when a defendant could not communi-
cate with the media. I24 
Recognizing that restrictions on trial participants are an ef-
fective method of inhibiting excessive trial publicity as estab-
lished in Sheppard v. Maxwell I25 and Nebraska Press Associa-
tion v. Stuart,128 the Ninth Circuit measured the district court's 
order against the Supreme Court's requirements for determining 
the validity of a prior restraint.127 While the court recognized 
that the right to a fair trial is guaranteed to an accused by the 
sixth amendment,128 it did not find that a corresponding right is 
so afforded to the prosecutor as a litigant.129 The court noted 
that the defendant's interest in seeking a partial jury was to be 
checked by society's interests and expectations in a fair result. ISO 
The Ninth Circuit confirmed the district court's finding that 
the publicity had created, and would continue to create, a clear 
and present danger or serious and imminent threat to the ad-
ministration of justice.lSl Emphasis was placed on the fact that 
122. [d. at 593 n.l. 
123. [d. Implicit within the court's reasoning is the assumption that statements 
made by the attorneys would be more credible, and therefore prejudicial, than state-
ments made directly by the defendant at his co-defendant's trial or by the defendant's 
family. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied sub nom., Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). 
124. 764 F.2d at 593 n.l. The court also noted that this petition did not challenge 
the government's ability to deny Miller direct contact with the media. [d. 
125. 384 U.S. 333, 360-63 (1966). 
126. 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976). 
127. 764 F.2d at 595. The Ninth Circuit held that such a challenge requires that the 
party requesting the order show that: (1) the activity restrained poses either a clear and 
present danger or a serious and imminent threat to a protected competing interest; (2) 
the order is narrowly drawn; and (3) less restrictive alternatives are not available. Id. 
(citations omitted). 
128. [d. at 596. 
129. [d. at 596-97. 
130. [d. at 597. 
131. [d. at 598. 
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the restraining order was aimed expressly at publicity generated 
during or immediately before trial, when the potential for 
prejudice was greater.132 
The court then reviewed the narrowness of the order and 
found that it was not unconstitutionally vague because it gave 
clear guidance as to the types of punishable speech.133 However, 
since many statements that bore upon the merits to be resolved 
by the jury did not present a threat to the administration of jus-
tice, the court agreed with the In re Halkin case that the order 
was overbroad.134 
The Ninth Circuit further found that the less restrictive al-
ternatives outlined in Nebraska Press Associationl31l would be 
ineffective or counterproductive in this situation.136 For exam-
ple, while a searching vior dire might eliminate bias caused by 
extrajudicial statements, it would not neutralize the prejudice 
caused during trial nor assuage harm inflicted on the integrity of 
132. Id. The court distinguished Nebraska Press Ass'n, CBS, and Associated Press, 
and explained that in those cases prior restraints were aimed solely at pretrial publicity 
and were invalidated on the grounds that an impartial jury could not be selected. Id. at 
598. See also Chicago Council of Lawyers, 522 F.2d at 253-54 (possibility of prejudice 
"more concrete" the closer to trial). 
133. 764 F.2d at 599. Cf. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 371 (4th Cir. 1979Hhold-
ing that "other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial" is too 
vague). 
134. 764 F.2d at 599 (citing In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 196-97 & n.51 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979». It suggested the self-imposed limitations set forth in 
28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b) for specific statements proscribed for the prosecution. The court also 
listed a number of subjects which would be applicable to the defense: 
Id. 
(1) the character, credibility, or reputation of a party; 
(2) the identity of a witness or the expected testimony of a 
party or a witness; 
(3) the contents of any pretrial confession, admission or state-
ment given by the defendant or that person's refusal or failure 
to make a statement; 
(4) the identity or physical evidence expected to be presented 
or the absence of such physical evidence; 
(5) the strengths and weaknesses of the case of either party; 
and 
(6) any other information the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence and would 
create a substantial risk of prejudice if disclosed. 
135. 427 U.S. at 563-64. 
136. 764 F.2d at 599-600. 
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the judicial process.137 Also, the court concluded that use of em-
phatic and clear instructions was frequently ineffective.13s Like-
wise, a change of venue or postponement of trial would not suf-
fice because national news coverage was involved and the threat 
of publicity would not abate. 13B Lastly, sequestering the jury 
might unnecessarily incur resentment or harassment and disrupt 
the quality of the jury's deliberations. 140 This, the court rea-
soned, would misplace the burden of prejudicial publicity on the 
jurors rather than on the attorneys who had caused it. 141 
The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for the writ of man-
damus142 because it concluded that the order restraining the at-
torneys' extrajudicial statements was appropriate in light of the 
inadequacies of other remedies.143 The reasons for the district 
court's order had adequately outweighed the heavy presumption 
against the validity of a prior restraint. H4 Accordingly, it upheld 
the gag order, but directed the district court to specify the pro-
scribed types of statements. l411 
137. Id. The district court found it ironic that it addressed the restraining order on 
the same day that it received a suggested voir dire questionnaire concerned with pretrial 
publicity. Id. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that counsels' misinterpre-
tation of their obligations concerning prejudicial comments would continue during trial 
and the voir dire would be powerless to eliminate the prejudice caused by such publicity. 




141. Id. at 601. 
142. Id. To determine the validity of issuing a writ of mandamus the court applied 
the guidelines set forth in Bauman v. United States District Court: 
(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, 
such as direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires. (2) 
The petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not cor-
rectable on appeal . . . . (3) The district court's order is 
clearly erroneous as a matter of law. (4) The district court's 
order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disre-
gard of the federal rules. (5) The district court's order raises 
new and important problems or issues of law of first 
impression. 
Id. at 593-94 (citing Bauman v. United States District Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th 
Cir. 1977». The court found the first three requirements were fulfilled and exercised its 
jurisdiction under mandamus. 764 F.2d at 593-94. 
143. Id. at 601. 
144. See supra notes 44-45. 
145. 764 F.2d at 601. 
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B. CONCURRENCE 
Judge Sneed wrote separately to express a slightly different 
view.148 The concurrence initially suggested that an attorney's 
respect for the profession and the integrity of the judicial pro-
cess should eliminate the need for these gag orders.147 It admit-
ted, however, that the level of professional conduct needed, and 
the incapacity of bar associations to secure such conduct, re-
quired the court to fix limits on the attorneys' "lobbying ef-
forts."148 Under the facts of this case, the concurrence agreed 
that the imposition of the gag order was proper.149 
Additionally, the concurring opinion agreed with the major-
ity that while the accused may seek, to some extent, a partial 
jury, the sixth amendment does not guarantee such a right.uo 
Moreover, the concurrence noted that the sixth amendment does 
not guarantee society a fair trial, but that society nonetheless 
expects one. un Yet because the accused has a right to an impar-
tial jury and the people merely an expectation of one, restraints 
on prosecutors may be more stringent than those on defense 
counsel. 1112 Thus where speech provokes or threatens an impar-
tial jury or fair trial, the concurrence reluctantly agreed that 
courts could impose narrowly drawn restraints. IllS 
C. DISSENT 
Judge Nelson, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
could not totally concur because she did not find an adequate 
showing of a clear and imminent danger or a serious and immi-
nent threat to an impartial jury.1114 Following the Ninth Circuit's 
earlier opinion in Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. United 
States District Court/ 1I11 the dissent focused on the impact of 
146. [d. at 601-03. 
147. [d. at 601 (Sneed, J., concurring). 
148. [d. at 601-02 (Sneed, J., concurring). 




153. [d. at 603 (Sneed, J., concurring). 
154. [d. See CBS v. United States District Court, 729 F.2d 1174, 1178-82 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
155. 729 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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the pretrial publicity rather than on its source.156 In assessing 
the prejudicial nature of pretrial publicity, the court in CBS had 
looked not only to the effect that the publicity might have had 
on the individual, but also to the impact that the publicity 
might have had to inflame the entire community. 157 
The dissent then argued that among twelve million people 
in the Central District of California an unbiased panel of jurors 
could be selected.158 The dissent found that gag orders on attor-
neys' statements were not always impermissible but rather dis-
tinguished the situation where the jury had been empaneled. 159 
In addition, the trial court judge would need to scrutinize anew 
the alternatives to the gag order.160 Remedies such as jury se-
questration and curative jury instructions would require re-ex-
amination of the degree and nature of the publicity at that time, 
as well as of the efficacy of the proposed order in curbing the 
publicity.161 
The dissent sympathized with the concerns about the pro-
fessional obligation of lawyers to refrain from engaging in pub-
licity campaigns and noted that rules of professional conduct are 
post-judgment remedies which are less effective but safer than 
prior restraints. 162 On this record, however, the dissenting opin-
ion noted that the publicity in this case was likely to be wide-
spread even if the attorneys' comments were restrained and, as a 
result, the benefits to the sixth amendment did not outweigh the 
costs to the first amendment.16s 
156. 764 F.2d at 603 (Nelson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See supra 
note 52 and accompanying text. 
157. 729 F.2d at 1180. See also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961) (murder 
conviction. reversed because "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice [was] shown to be 
present throughout the community."). 
158. 764 F.2d at 603-04 (Nelson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
159. [d. 
160. [d. at 604 (Nelson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
161. [d. Cf. Associated Press v. United States District Court, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th 
Cir. 1983). In Associated Press, the Ninth Circuit struck down a court-ordered sealing of 
documents finding that there was not a " 'substantial probability that closure [would] be 
effective in protecting against the perceived harm.''' [d. at 1146 (quoting United States 
v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
162. 764 F.2d at 604 (Nelson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
163. [d. See also Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 370 (4th Cir. 1979) (efficacy of 
the tactic of silencing attorneys is not complete answer since others, like police officers, 
speak to the press; but attorneys as officers of the court are held to a higher standard). 
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IV. CRITIQUE 
The trial court in this case was faced with the fact that prej-
udicial publicity had been generated and would continue to es-
calate. An initial admonition by the court to the parties to vol-
untarily restrain from prejudicial comments had gone 
unheeded. IS' As the Ogorodnikovs' trial neared, defense attor-
neys' extrajudicial statements increased. lSG Contemplating the 
dangers posed to the defendant's right to a fair trial, the court 
felt pressed to issue the gag order. ISS 
The use of a prior restraint inevitably raises the question of 
whether such a drastic measure is ever appropriate. ls7 The Su-
preme Court's hostility to prior restraints on the press is evident 
from its consistency in overruling such orders. lS8 Few-exceptions 
have been countenanced.ls9 Nonetheless, recent court decisions 
have embraced the suggestions set forth in Sheppard v. Max-
welll70 and have increasingly opted to gag attorneys and other 
164. See supra note 11. 
165. 764 F.2d at 592. When the Ninth Circuit denied the government's motion for 
an order restraining extrajudicial comments on December 14, 1984, defense counsel ad-
vised the court they they might "at some future time deem it necessary in the interest of 
our client to make a statement outside the courtroom." [d. 
166. [d. See supra note 8. 
167. See supra notes 44-45. 
168. In 1977 Stanford's Law School held a symposium in which numerous authors 
reviewed the Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart decision. See, e.g., Goodall, The Press Un-
gagged: The Practical Effect on Gag Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Association v. 
Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 497, 512-13 (1977); Portman, The Defense of Fair Trial from 
Sheppard to Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action 
and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. REV. 393, 409 (1977); Sack, Principle and Nebraska Press Asso-
ciation v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 411, 427 (1977); B. Schmidt, Nebraska Press Associa-
tion: An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 468 
(1977); R. Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Open or Shut Decision?, 29 STAN. L. 
REV. 529, 534 (1977). 
169. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rei. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The Supreme 
Court struck down an injunction involving a state statute which allowed enjoining any 
"malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical." [d. at 
701-02. The trial court had issued a permanent injunction against the defendant who 
had published anti-Semitic articles critical of local officials. The Supreme Court reversed 
the conviction on the grounds that a prior restraint is the "essence of censorship." [d. at 
713. The Court mentioned only three "exceptional cases" in which a prior restraint 
might be acceptable: (1) to prevent actual obstruction to the government's recruiting or 
publishing the sailing dates of transports, or the number and location of troops; (2) in 
obscene materials; and (3) to avoid acts of violence and the overthrow of the government. 
[d. at 701-02. See also cases cited infra note 179. 
170. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See supra note 26. 
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trial participants.17l 
It is not surprising that the Ninth Circuit viewed the facts 
here, involving the first FBI agent to be charged with espionage 
and of having an affair with his co-defendant, as the substance 
of potentially pervasive news coverage.172 However, the publicity 
here was not of the inflammatory and lurid nature that the Su-
preme Court had previously condemned.173 Since not all public-
ity, even if pervasive, denies a defendant a fair trial,174 the Ninth 
Circuit's affirmation of the prior restraint in this case attracts 
close scrutiny. 
The court's focus on attorneys as the source of the detri-
mental publicity rather than on the actual impact of that public-
ity led to a rule that inhibits the inherent function of the 
press.1711 Silencing attorneys of necessity implicates the media's 
access to that information.178 Limiting information is significant 
only when the attorneys are restricted access to the media who 
disseminate those comments to the public. Thus, whatever the 
courts choose to call it, the ultimate focus still must be on the 
press. Within this context, Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart 
has signalled the Supreme Court's hostility to the prior re-
171. E.g., In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979). 
The District of Columbia Circuit noted that an order directed only at trial participants 
represented a less sweeping curtailment of first amendment rights than an order broadly 
restraining the press. Id. at 195 & n.44. 
172. See supra note 3. 
173. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 542-43 (1976)(six 
members of family found murdered in their home; defendant had committed murders in 
course of sexual assault); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335-36 (1966)(defendant 
accused of bludgeoning his pregnant wife). See supra note 51. 
174. See supra note 18. 
175. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). There the Supreme Court 
remarked: 
A principle is that the effective self-government cannot suc-
ceed unless the people are immersed in a steady, robust, unim-
peded, and uncensored flow of opinion and reporting which 
are continuously subjected to critique, rebuttal, and re-exami-
nation. In this respect [the reporter's) status as a news gath-
erer and an integral part of that process becomes critical. 
Id. at 715. See also Levine, 775 F.2d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir. 1985) (Norris, J., dissenting 
from the denial of rehearing en banc)(to uphold the gag order "will significantly restrict 
the media's ability to gather information and the public's right to be informed about our 
criminal justice system."). 
176. Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Open or Shut Decision?, 29 STAN. L. 
REV. 529, 530 (1977). 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/9
1986] CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 75 
straint.177 It is well established that the public's need for a free 
flow of information is paramount.178 Indeed, with few narrow ex-
ceptions, cases raising a press issue in the interest of a fair trial 
have held the restraints to be unconstitutional.179 
This change in focus from the press to the attorneys is not, 
at first blush, too significant since the Ninth Circuit appropri-
ately confirmed the "clear and present danger" standard used to 
test a restraining order's validity. By holding that the record 
supported a clear and imminent danger, however, the court has 
required a less rigorous showing than has been demanded in the 
traditional press cases established in Nebraska Press Associa-
tion and its progeny.180 
Following Nebraska Press Association, the Ninth Circuit 
reviewed the efficacy of the more traditional, less burdensome 
alternatives.l8l In Levine, however, the court made no attempt 
to determine the effect of the publicity on the entire community. 
In Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. United States District 
Court, the court held that "in a large metropolitan area, prejudi-
cial publicity is less likely to endanger" the right of an accused 
to a fair trial. 182 Moreover, the Levine court reasoned that voir 
dire could not eliminate prejudice caused during the trial.183 Yet, 
177. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See supra note 45. 
178. See Note, supra note 46, at 96-97. 
179. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also New York Times v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). There, Justice Black viewed the publishing of the 
Pentagon Papers as "paramount among the responsibilities of a free press [whose duty 
is) to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them 
off to distant lands to die." [d. at 717. The Court recognized a narrow military exception 
which might justify the prior restraint when disclosure "will surely result in direct, im-
mediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people." [d. at 730. In Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-83 (1957), the validity of federal and state obscenity 
laws were sustained. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for mailing obscene 
books and advertisements and noted that "obscenity [is) utterly without redeeming so-
cial importance" and thus "not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or 
press." [d. at 485-86. In Chaplinsky v. New Hamphshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), the 
Supreme Court upheld a conviction under a statute based upon the "fighting words" 
doctrine declaring that libel, obscenity and "fighting words" are not afforded first 
amendment protection. 
180. See supra note 34. 
181. 764 F.2d at 599-600. 
182. 729 F.2d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 1983). 
183. In CBS, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court's reasoning amounted 
to a general rejection of voir dire as an effective alternative to prior restraints, when the 
district court stated that "No matter how searching the questions ... certain matters 
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it made no attempt to consider the effect of repeated and strong 
admonitions both to the trial participants and to the jury during 
the triaP84 Nor did the court consider the actual impact, if any, 
that the publicity would have on the jury.1811 The Ninth Circuit 
further accepted the district court's reasoning that sequestration 
is a greater burden than the effects of the restraining order.18s 
By doing this the court ignored the fact that although this mea-
sure would insulate jurors only after they are sworn, it would 
also enhance likelihood of diffusing the impact of pretrial pub-
licity and emphasize the elements of the jurors' oaths.187 Essen-
tially, the court focused its attention on a potentially burdened 
jury rather than on the interests of the public in obtaining the 
information or on the attorneys' freedom of expression. 
Above all, the court did not emphasize sufficiently the ethi-
cal obligations imposed by the disciplinary rules which regulate 
attorneys' conduct.188 While it is true that these disciplinary 
measures would come into effect only after the extrajudicial 
statements were made, subsequent remedies are a solution con-
sistent with the entire penal process. An accused who has been 
denied a fair trial may always exercise his right to appeal. This 
remedy is undoubtedly time consuming and costly but so too is 
the resort to a prior restraint.18s It is inevitable in a fair trial-
free speech case that the court will be compelled to elect the 
preeminence of one constitutional right over another. ISO As 
Judge Nelson noted in her dissenting opinion, "concern over the 
professional ethics of those who try their cases in the press, how-
ever, should not replace dispassionate analysis when First 
Amendment freedoms are in the balance."lsl 
are not detectable, especially those motives to bias and prejudice." 729 F.2d at 1182. 
184. Although unconventional, the court could consider continuing voir dire during 
the trial. 
185. In CBS, the court noted that potential jurors are untainted by press coverage 
even when exposed to widespread publicity. 729 F.2d at 1179. In November, 1985, 
Miller's trial for espionage ended in a mistrial giving support to the truth of this 
statement. 
186. 764 F.2d at 600. 
187. 427 U.S. at 564. 
188. 764 F.2d at 601 (Sneed, J., concurring). 
189. See supra note 44. 
190. Erickson, Fair Trial and Free Press: The Practical Dilemma, 29 STAN. L. REV. 
485, 489 (1977). 
191. 764 F.2d at 604 (Nelson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In the de-
nial of the rehearing en bane, the dissenting opinion argued that the range of options 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Absent controlling Supreme Court precedent, Levine is the 
first decision in any circuit approving a gag order on defense at-
torneys under the "clear and present danger" standard. ls2 The 
decision is therefore likely to have adverse consequences on the 
future of the free speech of trial participants. ls3 A potentially 
dangerous effect is the possibility of chilling the speech of attor-
neys called upon to represent unpopular defendants in high visi-
bility cases. IS4 The unpopular accused is especially dependent on 
his attorney to speak out publicly because the need to mitigate 
the damage caused by the indictment in the eyes of the commu-
nity is magnifiedlsil and because the need to seek a partial jury is 
critical. With the media's increasing interest in reporting on 
criminal activities, upholding the gag order in this case may sig-
nal the court's willingness to temper its position as to the valid-
ity of prior restraints. 
Elisa R. Paisner* 
available to the attorney in defending his client must include publicly speaking out to 
mitigate the damage caused to his client in the community by the government's accusa-
tion. 775 F.2d at 1055 (Norris, J., dissenting). 
192. [d. 
193. [d. 
194. [d. at 1056. 
195. [d. at 1055. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987. 
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SUMMARIES 
UNITED STATES u. BRANSON: 
NO NARROWING OF MIRANDA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States u. Branson/ the Ninth Circuit held that 
the prosecution's repeated references to the fact that defendant 
Roger Branson remained silent during his post-arrest interroga-
tion, after he had been read his Miranda2 rights, violated his 
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.3 
II. FACTS 
Branson was arrested and charged with knowingly passing 
counterfeit bills.4 Following his arrest, after he had received the 
Miranda warnings, Branson refused to respond when he was 
asked about the source of the counterfeit money. Ii Later, at trial, 
the prosecution referred to this silence as proof that Branson 
1. 756 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members were 
Pregerson, J., and Stephens, D.J., Senior United States District Judge for the Central 
District of California, sitting by designation. 
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See infra notes 9-14 and accompanying text. 
3. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall [any person] be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
4. 756 F.2d at 753. 
5. [d. Branson was charged under a statute which requires that the government 
prove knowledge of falsity as an element of the crime of counterfeiting. Branson was 
arrested after he purchased a money order with three counterfeit bills. The Secret Ser-
vice traced the bills through the money order to Branson. 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1970). 
79 
31
Paisner and Williams: Criminal Law and Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986
80 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:79 
knew the money was counterfeit.s A jury convicted Branson of 
knowingly passing counterfeit money, and he appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit.? 
III. BACKGROUND 
The fifth amendment commands that no person shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.8 
In Miranda v. Arizona,9 the Supreme Court held that this privi-
lege against self-incrimination can only be fulfilled if an individ-
ual's silence during an in-custody interrogation is protected from 
the government's use of that silence as inferential proof of 
guilt.1o The Court stated that it is impermissible to penalize an 
individual for exercising his fifth amendment privilege by al-
lowing the prosecution to imply that silence in the face of an 
accusation is in itself damning.ll 
Miranda recognized that the fifth amendment privilege may 
be waived.12 The Miranda Court held, however, that if the gov-
ernment claims a waiver, it bears a heavy burden of showing 
that the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. IS More-
over, even after waiving the privilege by beginning to talk, a de-
fendant may revoke this waiver by indicating in any manner, at 
any time, prior to or during the interrogation, a desire to remain 
silent.14 
The Ninth Circuit has recognized a selective revocation of a 
6.Id. 
7. Id. Branson did not object to the use of his silence by the prosecutor at trial 
under the belief that an objection would compound the prejudice against him. SiMe 
Branson did not object, the Ninth Circuit had to find a "plain error" in the proceedings 
before review was proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b). Id. 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda warnings consist of the following: (1) a person 
has the right to remain silent, (2) anything he says can be used against him in a court of 
law, (3) he has a right to the presence of an attorney, and (4) if he cannot afford an 
attorney, one will be appointed for him. Unless the warnings are given and a knowing 
and intelligent waiver demonstrated. evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation 
may not be used against a defendant as proof of guilt. Id. at 478. 
10. Id. at 460. 
11. Id. at 468 n.37. 
12. Id. at 473. 
13. Id. at 475. 
14. Id. at 473. 
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waiver.lli A suspect may indicate a willingness to respond to 
some questions and not to others, and this intermittent silence 
will be protected.16 The court established the limit of a selective 
waiver in United States v. Lorenzo.17 When the defendant re-
fused to answer a single question in the midst of an extended, 
entirely voluntary exculpatory statement, the court held that the 
right to remain silent had not been invoked. IS In the court's 
view, this brief silence merely amounted to an uncomfortable 
pause during a narration, not an indication of a desire to remain 
silent.19 Consequently, the prosecutor's reference to the defend-
ant's silence was not error, since that event was not protected by 
the fifth amendment.2o 
The opposite result was reached by the court in Scarbor-
ough v. Arizona.21 The defendant, after his arrest, neither an-
swered questions, nor made an exculpatory statement.22 At the 
trial, the prosecutor pointed out that the defendant had re-
mained silent after being accused of the crimes.23 Since the de-
fendant's conduct was a clear invocation of the fifth amendment 
privilege, the court held that any reference to his silence was 
fundamental error.2• 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The primary issue considered by the court was whether 
Branson had successfully revoked his initial waiver of the fifth 
amendment privilege by refusing to continue responding to 
questions after being asked where he had obtained the counter-
feit bills.21i 
15. United States v. Lorenzo, 570 F.2d 294, 298 (9th Cir. 1978). 
16. [d. 
17. 570 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1978). 
18. [d. at 298. Defendant Lorenzo, like Branson, was accused and convicted of 
knowingly passing counterfeit money. [d. at 294. 
19. [d. at 298. 
20. [d. 
21. 531 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1976). Defendant Scarborough was arrested for robbery 
and assault with a deadly weapon. [d. at 960. 
22. [d. at 960. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. at 961. 
25. 756 F.2d at 753. The court also addressed the government's contention that, 
even if there were prosecutorial error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and 
did not contribute to the jury's verdict. There was dramatic evidence to the contrary, 
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The court began its analysis by rejecting the government's 
reliance on United States u. Lorenzo.26 Factually, Lorenzo dif-
fered significantly from Branson. While Branson neither offered 
an exculpatory story, nor resumed talking after initially refusing 
to answer a question,27 Lorenzo's conduct was marked by a will-
ingness to speak on his own behalf, both before and after refus-
ing to answer the single question.28 Branson had, by his unam-
biguous conduct, successfully communicated to the arresting 
officers that he wished to remain silent.29 Consequently, Branson 
had totally revoked his earlier waiver of the privilege, and any 
use of that protected silence was plain error.30 The facts in 
Branson more closely resembled those in Scarborough u. Ari-
zona,31 since neither defendant resumed speaking after initially 
refusing to answer a question, and neither offered an exculpa-
tory narrative.32 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, applied its hold-
ing in Scarborough to Branson by ruling that to allow the state 
to use the defendant's silence against him would violate the 
spirit of the fifth amendment.88 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit acted correctly in firmly rejecting the 
government's attempt to narrow the right to revoke a waiver of 
the fifth amendment privilege. Once the court decided that 
Branson had revoked his waiver, the well-established principle 
that a defendant's post-Miranda silence may not be used against 
him controlled. The Ninth Circuit acted consistently with its 
previous decisions, United States Supreme Court authority and 
the Constitution, by properly refusing to countenance the prose-
however. After the jurors had begun their deliberations, they sent a note to the judge 
asking him if they could base their decision on Branson's silence when he was asked 
about the source of the money. The judge responded that they were free to consider any 
relevant evidence. The court concluded that the reasonable inference was that the prose-
cutor's reference to Branson's silence did influence the verdict and that, therefore, it was 
not harmless. [d. at 754. 
26. 570 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1978). 
27. 756 F.2d at 754. 
28. [d. at 753. 
29. [d. 
30. [d. The use of this protected silence was the "plain error" needed by the review-
ing court to overturn the lower court. See supra note 7. 
31. 531 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1976). 
32. 756 F.2d at 754. 
33. [d. 
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cution's use of a defendant's protected silence. 
Michael S. Williams* 
u.s. u. FLYNT: REAFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE 
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPACITY 
TO COMMIT A CRIME 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States u. Flynt, l the Ninth Circuit held that the 
district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a contin-
uance to enable the defendant to obtain psychiatric evidence, 
where his only defense to the charge of contempt of court was 
lack of mental capacity to commit the offense.2 The Ninth Cir-
cuit also ruled that the imposition of a summary contempt sen-
tence is erroneous where there is a substantial issue as to the 
defendant's mental capacity to commit contempt.3 
II. FACTS 
Defendant Larry Flynt, during his arraignment on an in-
dictment for flag desecration4 and for illegally wearing a Purple 
Heart, launched an obscene verbal attack on the federal magis-
trate conducting the proceeding. II The district judge, assigned by 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986 
1. 756 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.), modified, 764 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Reinhardt, 
J.; the other panel members were Fletcher, J., and Ely, J.). (Judge Ely died before the 
opinion was prepared, but he heard the arguments and concurred in the result.) 
2. [d. at 1362. 
3. [d. at 1366. 
4. Flynt wore an American flag as a diaper during an earlier, unrelated court ap-
pearance. [d. lit 1355. 
5. Part of the dialogue between the magistrate and Flynt was as followa: 
THE MAGISTRATE: All right. I am going to appoint 
Mr. Isaacman to represent you as your attorney for these pro-
ceedings. you may choose to call-
THE DEFENDANT: Then take my ass to jail, cock-
sucker, because 1-
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the magistrate to try the case, sent Flynt to the Medical Center 
for Federal Prisoners to undergo a psychiatric examination to 
determine his competence to stand trial.s The magistrate also 
ordered Flynt to show cause before the Chief Judge to the Dis-
trict Court why he should not be held in criminal contempt for 
the obscenities he hurled at the court during the arraignment.' 
At the contempt hearing, Flynt's attorney informed the 
court that the defense would be based on a lack of mental capac-
ity to commit contempt, and requested a thirty-day continuance 
to obtain expert testimony and substitute counsel,8 The court 
THE MAGISTRATE: All right. 
THE DEFENDANT: -refuse to go through this bullshit. 
THE MAGISTRATE: All right, would you proceed with 
the arraignment? 
THE DEFENDANT: You, dumb, ignorant mother-fucker. 
Now, I am telling you; you are not going to get away with this. 
THE MAGISTRATE: Proceed with the arraignment. 
THE DEFENDANT: There are [sic) no fucking way you 
are going to get sway with it. You are denying me my counsel 
of my choice. You are just as dumb as that goddamn Burger 
up there on the Supreme Court, and I am ready to stay in jail 
until hell freezes over or until I have the attorney of my 
choice. 
You goddamn, no good, 14 karat piece of shit. Just cause 
you got on that robe, you don't have any goddamn right to 
abuse the Constitution that you are supposed to be upholding. 
[d. at 1355 n.l. 
6. Flynt's psychiatric examinations were completed in January 1984. The govern-
ment psychiatrists concluded that Flynt suffered a mental disease characterized by fre-
netic activity, restlessness, grandiosity, flight of ideas, instability, and antisocial behav-
ior. The psychiatrists concluded that Flynt had an intense need for control and 
attention, which manifested itself in abusive and uncontrollable courtroom behavior. The 
report concluded, however, that Flynt was competent to stand trial. [d. at 1365. 
7. [d. at 1355. One of the issues Flynt raised on appeal was that the magistrate's 
assignment of the contempt hearing to the chief judge was not random as required by 
General Order 224, Rule 8.1. (C.D. Cal. Rules of the Court). This Rule requires random 
assignment of criminal cases to district judges to assure fairness and objectivity. The 
government argued that only arraignable crimes are covered by this Rule. However, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the crime of contempt is entitled to the same assurance of fair-
ness as other crimes, and therefore Order 224 applies to criminal contempt proceedings 
as well. 756 F.2d at 1355 n.2. 
8. Because Flynt had been incarcerated prior to the hearing at the Medical Center 
for Federal Prisoners, he had been unable to obtain examinations by psychiatrists of his 
own choosing. Flynt made several attempts to consult with psychiatric experts while he 
was at the Medical Center. He filed an ex parte application for transfer back to Califor-
nia to see his own psychiatrists, and also two habeas corpus petitions seeking both better 
medical care at the Prisoners' Medical Center and opportunities to consult with wit-
nesses regarding pending litigation. [d. at 1356. 
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denied this motion, finding that there was no basis for the re-
quest. A one-day continuance was granted to permit Flynt to ob-
tain substitute counsel, and the hearing was continued the fol-
lowing day.9 
Defense counsel renewed the motion for a thirty-day contin-
uance when the hearing reconvened, presenting evidence that 
Flynt's psychiatric experts could not complete their evaluation 
within the previously granted one-day continuance. Once again, 
the motion was denied.10 
During this second appearance, Flynt responded with a 
number of obscene epithets when asked about his outbursts at 
the arraignment.ll Flynt was gagged and was admonished that 
further outbursts would be punished by summary contempt cita-
tions. With the gag removed, he engaged in several additional 
bouts of offensive language. After each, he was summarily found 
guilty of contempt, and sentenced to thirty-day prison terms.lI 
At the close of the hearing, the district court found Flynt 
guilty of contempt at the time of the arraignment, and sen-
tenced him to six-months' imprisonment. This sentence pro-
voked another outburst, and the judge summarily sentenced him 
to an additional six months in prison. The contempt sentences 
9. [d. 
10. Flynt's attorney informed the judge that a psychiatrist, psychologist and a 
psychopharmacologist had all been contacted and had agreed to evaluate Flynt, but 
could not do so within the constraint of a one-day continuance. Flynt's defense conse-
quently consisted of nonexpert witnesses whose attempts to testify as to Flynt's mental 
condition were disallowed by the district judge on the ground of lack of qualifications. 
[d. 
11. The following is an example of Flynt's abusive language, spoken when the judge 
had concluded sentencing: 
THE DEFENDANT: Give me more, mother-fucker. Is 
that all you can give me, you chicken shit cocksucker? Lay 18 
months on me, you dumb mother-fucker. 
THE COURT: Now-
THE DEFENDANT: Fuck you in your ass. 
THE COURT: That is enough. 
THE DEFENDANT: You suck-
THE COURT: That will be another six months which will 
also be consecutive. 
THE DEFENDANT: I want you to give me more. Give 
me more. 
[d. at 1357 n.6. 
12. [d. at 1357. 
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totalled fifteen months. 13 Flynt appealed the contempt convic-
tions to the Ninth Circuit. 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit first analyzed the district court's denial 
of a continuance. It then addressed the judge's use of the sum-
mary contempt power. 
A. THE DENIAL OF A CONTINUANCE 
1. Background 
In considering the denial of the continuance,14 the Ninth 
Circuit focused on the procedural fairness of the proceedings, as 
there was no question that the contempt had been committed. 1 Ii 
In particular, it recognized the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Ake v. Oklahoma,18 which emphasized the crucial importance 
psychiatric testimony may have whenever the defendant's 
mental condition is relevant to criminal culpability. 
Four factors were identified as relevant in deciding whether 
13. [d. Flynt served more than five months in prison before being released by a 
Ninth Circuit panel pending this review. [d. at 1358. 
14. The lower court's discretion to deny or grant a continuance will not be disturbed 
on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. A clear abuse of discretion will not be 
found unless the lower court's action was arbitrary or unreasonable. [d. 
15. [d. 
16. 108 S.Ct. 1087 (1985). When an indigent defendant in a murder prosecution was 
not provided with psychiatric assistance to support an insanity defense, the Supreme 
Court stated: "[W]hen the State has made the defendant's mental condition relevant to 
his criminal culpability, and to the punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a psy-
chiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshall his defense." [d. at 
1095. 
See also United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275, 1280-81 (5th Cir. 1976) (abuse of 
discretion to deny a continuance to obtain psychiatric records to establish insanity de-
fense where this was the only defense available); United States v. Walker, 537 F.2d 1192, 
1194 (4th Cir. 1976) (abuse of discretion to deny a continuance to obtain psychiatric 
evidence where psychiatrist had determined in only a 30-minute examination that de-
fendant was competent to stand trial). 
The test in the Ninth Circuit for determining the mental capacity to commit an 
offense is whether "at the time of the alleged criminal conduct, as a result of mental 
disease or defect [the defendant] lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of the law or to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct." Flynt, 756 
F.2d at 1365 n.11 (quoting United States v. Monroe, 552 F.2d 860, 863 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977)). 
38
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/9
1986] CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 87 
Flynt's procedural rights had been violated. First, the appellant 
must have been diligent in preparing his defense prior to the 
hearing. I7 Second, the continuance must serve a useful pur-
pose.I8 Third, the reviewing court must examine the inconve-
nience that might be caused to the district court or to the oppos-
ing party if the continuance is granted.I9 Finally, the court must 
weigh the harm to the appellant caused by the denial of the 
continuance.2o 
2. Discussion 
With regard to the first factor, the court noted that Flynt 
had been sufficiently diligent in preparing his defense.21 While 
incarcerated in the Medical Center, he had sought release, to no 
avail, for the purpose of obtaining psychiatric evaluations,22 but 
had remained in detention until three days before the hearing.23 
Moreover, at the time of requesting the continuance, he had 
contacted and retained psychiatric experts; the one-day continu-
ance granted by the court was, however, insufficient to conduct 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 926 (1977). Defendant, on trial for the sale of cocaine, had more than a month to 
find substitute counsel before trial. Not only was defendant's failure to secure substitute 
counsel due to lack of due diligence, but also the defendant made no showing that 
prejudice was caused by denial of a continuance. [d. at 744. Cf. United States v. Barret, 
703 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983). When the defendant was notified only eight days before 
trial that the government was going to use an expert to establish identification through 
photographs taken at bank robbery, and defendant's diligent effort to obtain his own 
expert was unavailing, the court's failure to grant a continuance to secure an expert was 
a clear abuse of discretion. [d. at 1080. 
18. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1979). Defendant, a 
heroin dealer, did not show that he would be able to make use of a continuance, since he 
presented no showing that the sought-after evidence was obtainable or actually existed. 
[d. at 746. 
19. See, e.g., United States v. Shuey, 541 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 1092 (1977). In a prosecution under the Mann Act (18 U.S.C. § 2422,), a continu-
ance to obtain substitute counsel was properly denied when the government had ob-
tained six witnesses from another state. [d. at 847. 
20. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 706 F.2d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 1983). Defendant 
failed to show he was prejudiced by the denial of a continuance since he was unable to 
identify any evidence he would have been able to present had the continuance been 
granted. [d. at 1053. 
21. In reaching the conclusion that diligence had been shown, the court did not go 
so far as to ratify Flynt's course of conduct. The court conceded that in other circum-
stances, Flynt might fail to satisfy the diligence factor. Flynt, 756 F.2d at 1360. 
22. 756 F.2d at 1359. 
23. [d. 
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the necessary tests.24 
The second factor considered was whether the continuance 
under the circumstances of this case would have been useful to 
him in establishing a viable defense.211 The Ninth Circuit ob-
served that the evidence before the district court of Flynt's de-
fense that he lacked mental capacity to commit contempt, his 
erratic behavior, and the availability of psychiatric experts, as 
well as other factors,26 clearly indicated that the testimony 
would be relevant. In this situation, the showing that expert tes-
timony was available and relevant was held to be sufficient to 
demonstrate the usefulness of a continuance.27 
The third factor, inconvenience to the court or opposing 
party, was not an obstacle to the granting of the continuance in 
this case. It would not have involved any rescheduling difficul-
ties for the court, and the government had no witnesses to call.28 
The fourth factor, prejudice, was critical to the decision to 
overrule the denial of the continuance.29 Flynt's courtroom con-
duct could not be disputed, and the sole defense was that he 
lacked the requisite mental capacity to commit the offense. He 
could not establish this defense without expert witnesses. The 
court discounted the testimony of the non-expert witnesses who 
did testify precisely because they lacked any qualifications to 
testify on the subject. so In view of the pivotal role played by ex-
pert testimony, the trial court's denial of a continuance effec-
tively deprived Flynt of the opportunity to present any defense. 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the denial of the 
continuance was arbitrary and unreasonable. SI 
24. See supra note 10. 
25. 756 F.2d at 1360. 
26. [d. The district court had before it the report from the Medical Center. See 
supra note 6. 
27. The court concluded that the district judge could not reasonably have demanded 
greater specificity than that the evidence would be relevant since he had denied Flynt an 
opportunity to gather that evidence. 756 F.2d at 1360. 
28. [d. 
29. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. The importance of psychiatric testi-
mony was "compelling" in the Ninth Circuit's view, and Flynt suffered "severe" 
prejudice by being denied expert psychiatric testimony. 756 F.2d at 1361-62. 
30. See supra note 10. 
31. 756 F.2d at 1362. 
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B. USE OF SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWER 
The district court, viewing Flynt's obscene disruptions dur-
ing the contempt hearing, exercised its power to punish contu-
macious behavior through summary proceedings.32 The Ninth 
Circuit addressed the question of whether this summary con-
tempt power had been appropriately exercised.33 
1. Background 
There are two statutory prerequisites for the exercise of the 
power to summarily punish a defendant for contempt of court. 
First, the contempt must have occurred within the sight and 
hearing of the judge. Second, the conduct must have taken place 
in the actual presence of the court.34 However, since the use of 
the power dispenses with ordinarily required procedural protec-
tions, it is only appropriate when the court is fully cognizant of 
all the facts bearing on the contumacious conduct, and when in-
stant punishment is necessary to avoid disruption of ongoing 
proceedings.311 In all cases, only the least possible power to 
32. The source of the district court's summary contempt power lies in the Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure which states in pertinent part: 
a. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if 
the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct 
constituting the contempt and that it was committed 
in the actual presence of the court. 
b. A criminal contempt ... shall be prosecuted on no-
tice. The notice shall [allow] a reasonable time for the 
preparation of the defense . . . . If the contempt 
charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, 
that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or 
hearing. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42. 
33. The appellate court reviewed the lower court's action under an abuse of discre-
tion standard. 756 F.2d at 1362 (citing United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975». 
When witnesses who were granted immunity in a robbery prosecution refused to testify, 
there was no abuse of discretion in imposing a summary contempt sentence to protect 
the orderly progress of a criminal trial, especially when judge, jurors, and witnesses were 
all waiting, and the refusal to testify was an open, serious threat to the continuation of 
the trial. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. at 319. 
34. The justifications for the summary contempt power include the fact that a judge 
must have a method of immediately remedying in-court disruption of ongoing proceed-
ings, and also that the judge, being a percipient witness, has the facts of the contempt· 
before him. Flynt, 756 F.2d at 1363. 
35. Id. at 1364. 
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achieve the proposed end may be used.36 Since it combines the 
functions of judge, jury, and prosecutor in one person, the sum-
mary contempt power is subject to abuse, and therefore its use 
must remain extraordinary and undertaken only after careful 
thought. 37 
In Panico v. United States,as the defendant was summarily 
cited for his courtroom behavior, despite a contention that 
mental illness made him incapable of forming the criminal in-
tent requisite for the crime.39 The Supreme Court held that fair 
administration of criminal justice requires a plenary hearing 
under Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 42(b)·o to determine a 
defendant's criminal responsibility for his conduct.41 
In Rollerson v. United States,·2 the District of Columbia 
Circuit struck down a summary contempt conviction imposed by 
a district judge after the defendant threw a water pitcher at the 
prosecutor. The defendant's evidence as to his insanity 
presented as a defense to the underlying charge raised a sub-
stantial issue·3 as to his criminal responsibility for his in-court 
conduct. Therefore, a Rule 42(b) evidentiary hearing was 
mandated.·· 
2. Discussion 
In Flynt, the judge had both seen and heard the contempt, 
and it had occurred in the actual presence of the district court.411 
However, that court had before it evidence that raised a sub-
36. [d. at 136~ (citing United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316 (1975». 
37. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319 (1975). See also United States v. 
Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981). In this case, a lawyer who continually dis-
obeyed the court's instructions was summarily cited for contempt. The Ninth Circuit 
stated that because the summary contempt power has a manifest potential for abuse, a 
full Rule 42(b) hearing will be required if the judge cannot marshall all the facts to 
support the summary action. [d. at 1020. 
38. 375 U.S. 29 (1975). 
39. [d. at 30. 
40. See supra note 32. 
41. 375 U.S. at 30. 
42. 343 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
43. Flynt, 756 F.2d at 1364 (citing Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269, 277 
(D.C. Cir. 1964))(emphasis added in Flynt, 756 F.2d at 1364). 
44. 343 F.2d at 277. 
45. 756 F.2d at 1364. 
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stantial issue as to Flynt's criminal responsibility.46 The district 
court had the Medical Center's report detailing Flynt's personal-
ity disorders. Additionally, the judge had witnessed Flynt's vio-
let language and bizarre behavior.47 Without further information 
about the psychiatric basis and causation of this behavior, the 
court was not equipped to decide whether the defendant was ca-
pable of the crime. The Ninth Circuit, therefore, adopted the 
"substantial issue" test developed in Rollerson. Because the dis-
trict court did not hold a full Rule 42(b) hearing, even though 
Flynt had clearly raised a substantial issue as to his mental ca-
pacity, his summary convictions of contempt were reversed.48 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that Flynt was un-
fairly denied a continuance that would certainly have been piv-
otal to his defense. The evidence of mental instability was sim-
ply too dramatic to ignore, and therefore prejudice to Flynt 
entirely outweighed any relevant countervail~ng considerations. 
The Ninth Circuit also properly struck down the district 
court's summary imposition of punishment. However extreme 
the provocation, the Ninth Circuit could not countenance the 
abuse of the summary contempt power. A judge may never in-
voke the power beyond the minimum needs of the court, and in 
the future may not do so at all where a substantial issue is raised 
concerning the defendant's criminal capacity. By reversing the 
convictions, the Ninth Circuit strongly vindicated the crucial 
46. [d. at 1365. The court also questioned the district judge's imposition of a six-
month sentence at the close of the hearing. There was no disruption of ongoing proceed-
ings since the proceedings were ending. [d. at 1366 n.13. 
47. [d. at 1366-67. The fact that the judge had witnessed Flynt's remarks was signif-
icant in another context as well. A judge should recuse himself in the interests of fairness 
if that judge was the object of the contemnor's attacks. [d. at 1366 n.13. Under a Rule 
42(b) hearing, a judge involved in the contempt must not preside over the contempt 
hearing. See supra note 32. 
48. 756 F.2d at 1366. Appellate courts have a special responsibility to protect 
against abuse of the summary contempt power. See supra note 37 and accompany text. 
In Flynt, the court decided that remanding the case would serve no purpose, since the 
five months already served by Flynt were clearly in excess of the least possible power 
adequate to achieve the proposed end, which was presumably vindication of the court's 
authority. Rather, the punishment meted out may have instead accomplished Flynt's 
purposes, since he could then see that his abusive language had hit the bull's eye. There-
fore, all of Flynt's contempt convictions were vacated and reversed. 756 F.2d at 1366. 
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importance of a defendant's mental state to a fair adjudication 
of guilt or innocence. 
Michael S. Williams· 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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